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In this article we address the following question: does culture play a role in economic 
behavior?  We conclude that culture influences economic behavior in all three areas of 
economic activity: work, consumption, and leisure. Our proof lies not so much in replicating 
certain experimental results, but in documenting in real-world circumstances how culture 
influences economic behavior. Attention to the role of culture in economic affairs 
acknowledges that humans are more than the one-dimensional, autonomous, individuals, as 
premised in mainstream economics, whose very existence is temporal, whose role in 
economic affairs is strictly instrumental, and whose behavior is virtually the same across 
cultures. We have argued that humans are two-dimensional twice over. First, humans are 
individual beings and social beings: solitary and communal, self-made and culture-bound, 
autonomous and dependent, rational and emotional, self-centered and other-centered. Second, 
humans are both matter and spirit. The duality of the human person, rooted in individuality 
and sociality, affords an opportunity to unify economic theory wherein individuality is the 
focus of microeconomics and sociality is the center of macroeconomics. Putting the isolated 
individual at the very heart of economics closes down that opportunity and assures that 
mainstream economic theory will remain truncated indefinitely. The makeover of mainstream 
economics will take place once neo-classical economists accept that the ultimate end of 
economic systems relates not to maximum personal net advantage but to integral human 
development.  
 
Key words: Culture and economic behavior, mainstream economics and individualism, 
personalist economics and personalism, duality of the human person.   




















En este artículo se aborda la siguiente pregunta: ¿juega la cultura un rol relevante en el 
comportamiento económico? Concluimos que la cultura influye en el comportamiento económico 
en las tres áreas de la actividad económica: trabajo, consumo y ocio. Nuestro artículo no radica 
tanto en aportar resultados experimentales, como en documentar el modo en que la cultura influye 
sobre el comportamiento económico en curcunstancias reales. Centrar la atención en el rol que 
desempeña la cultura en los asuntos económicos permite reconocer que los humanos son algo más 
que seres unidimensionales, autónomos, individuales, como supone la economía mainstream, cuya 
existencia es temporal, cuyo rol en los asuntos económicos es estrictamente instrumental y cuyo 
comportamiento es prácticamente el mismo en todas las culturas. Argumentamos que los seres 
humanos presentan dos dimensiones por partida doble. En primer lugar, los seres humanos son 
seres individuales y sociales: solitarios y comunales, que se hacen a sí mismos y culturalmente 
vinculados, autónomos y dependientes, racionales y emocionales, centrados en sí mismos y en los 
demás. En segundo lugar, los seres humanos son tanto materia como espíritu. La dualidad del ser 
humano, arraigado en la individualidad y en la sociabilidad, brinda la oportunidad de unificar la 
teoría económica en la que la individualidad es el foco de la microeconomía y la sociabilidad es el 
centro de la macroeconomía. Poner al individuo aislado en el corazón mismo de la economía cierra 
esa oportunidad y garantiza que la teoría económica mainstream permanecerá indefinidamente 
truncada. El cambio de imagen de la economía mainstream tendrá lugar cuando los economistas 
neoclásicos acepten que el fin último del sistema económico no reside en el máximo beneficio neto 
por persona sino en el desarrollo humano integral. 
__________________________________________________________________   
Palabras clave: Cultura y comportamiento económico, economía mainstream e individualismo, 
economías personalistas y personalismo, dualidad del ser humano.  




n article published by Joseph Henrich 15 years ago begins with 
this question:  Do all humans share the same economic decision-
making processes? Using experimental evidence from playing the 
Ultimatum Game with Peruvian villagers (the Machiguenga) and UCLA 
graduate students, Henrich questions the validity of the premise that 
notwithstanding cultural differences “all humans share the same economic 
decision-making processes, the same sense of fairness, and/or the same taste 
for punishment.” (Henrich 2000, p. 978).  
As with other experimental economists Henrich employs “fairness” and 
“punishment” to characterize human behavior that rewards a person who is 
“fair” and punishes a person who is “unfair.” A 50-50 split of the money 
offered to the players indicates fairness and a 0-100 split indicates 
unfairness.   
In the following we address the same question raised by Henrich: does 
culture play a role in economic behavior?  However, before we can proceed 
it is necessary to define the terms that are central to addressing that question 
properly. We conclude that culture indeed matters, calling for a 




Justice. If fair and unfair are synonyms in experimental economics for “just” 
and “unjust,” the terms are used inappropriately. In the most general sense, 
justice has to do with what one person owes another person or group of 
persons. In economic affairs this obligation is defined in terms of the three 
kinds of human interactions: (1) between equals, (2) between the superior 
and his/her subordinates, and (3) between a member and the group to which 
he/she belongs (Dempsey 1958, p. 165).  
In the first type of interaction, commutative justice spells out the duty of 
buyer to seller in a routine exchange: to exchange things of equal value and 
to impose equal burdens on one another. In the second kind of interaction, 
A
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distributive justice spells out the duty of the work-group supervisor to the 
members of that group: to distribute the benefits and burdens among group 
members in some equal or proportional fashion. In the third type of 
interaction, contributive justice sets forth the duty of a member to the rest of 
the group: insofar as a member receives benefits through group membership, 
that member has a duty to maintain and support the group. To illustrate, 
duping a buyer with counterfeit goods and passing bad checks violate 
commutative justice. Racial and gender discrimination violate distributive 
justice. Insurance fraud and insider trading violate contributive justice. 
In Ultimatum Games experiments where the two paired persons do not know 
one another, as in Henrich’s experiments, it is not possible for either one to 
be driven by fairness or punishment because both persons must have specific 
knowledge of the other to establish a legitimate basis for fairness or 
punishment. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to pass judgment on 
another. Anonymity, in other words, rules out any reasonable grounds for 
describing their behavior as fair or unfair.  
Additionally, just and unjust, fair and unfair,  do not apply in the 
Ultimatum Game because the money offered to the proposer-responder pair 
is not owed to either one or both under any of the three principles of 
economic justice. Rabin (1993, pp. 1281-1302) introduces “kindness” as a 
synonym for fairness, and shortly thereafter Camerer and Thaler (1995, pp. 
216-217) interpret Rabin as meaning punishment or “manners” and proceed 
to introduce “polite” and “rude” for fair and unfair. Their effort fails because 
etiquette reduces to a set of rules such as tennis players shaking hands at the 
net at the end of the game. Because the rules of etiquette often are arbitrary 
they cannot be confirmed or rejected by rational discourse. Justice, on the 
other hand, is much more than a set of rules subject to change. Put simply, 
etiquette is conformance, justice is virtue. 
The permanent nature of the principles of justice as applied to economic 
affairs is confirmed by observing the chaos in modern economic systems 
that do not restrain and punish persons engaged in such practices as 
counterfeiting goods, passing bad checks, openly discriminating against 
56   O’Boyle  – Does Culture Matter in Economic Behaviour? 
 
 
minorities in the workplace, defrauding their insurance companies, or using 
confidential information to take advantage of others in stock market 
transactions. 
The money allotted in Ultimatum Game is a gift1 governed not by 
etiquette but by generosity. Indeed Camerer and Thaler (1995, p. 215) use 
“generous” in the very same article in which they embrace the economics of 
etiquette, and Rabin uses “generous” in the article that impressed Camerer 
and Thaler. Thus, it is not a question of how much the proposer in the 
experiment owes the responder. Rather it is a question as to how generous 
the one should be in sharing the gift with the other. Unlike the virtue of 
justice, generosity does not require the giver to have specific knowledge of 
the recipient. For these reasons, we suggest that “generous” and “selfish” are 
better suited to the Ultimatum Game than any other pair commonly used. 
Generosity and selfishness, in turn, may be conditioned by a variety of 
factors including whether the proposer and responder see one another2 as 
friends/neighbors or as rivals/adversaries. Most importantly generosity and 
selfishness reflect how both parties value human life itself. Two options are 
available: a human being has value only in instrumental terms or is precious 
quite apart from any instrumental value and is properly considered an end 
and not just a means. Thus, following John Paul II (1981, § II), the effect of 
work on the worker is more important than the things produced through 
work  Clearly, these contrasting views, which are importantly shaped by 
both faith and reason, are fundamental to cultural development. In this 
regard, note that such enduring works of art and music as Michelangelo’s 
ceiling in the Sistine chapel and Handel’s Messiah are inspired by faith and 
revelation, and such magnificent structures as the Gateway Arch and the 
Golden Gate Bridge spring from human intelligence and aesthetics.  
Culture. Culture, it seems, is only loosely defined in experimental 
economics, and probably has different meanings among experimental 
economists. Dulles (1999, p. 2) provides a helpful definition.  
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[Culture] is a social force that encompasses individuals and welds 
them into communities. It shapes their prejudices, ideas, values, 
habits, attitudes, tastes, and priorities... Whereas politics and 
economics are concerned with proximate and limited goods, culture 
has to do with the meaning of human existence as a whole. It inquires 
into what we are as human beings, and what reality is in its most 
comprehensive dimensions.  
 
Culture is expressed, for example, through art, literature, and music, 
reflecting long-lasting social values such as equality, freedom, and 
community and such cherished traits of character as courage, fidelity, and 
truthfulness.  
Pop culture also finds expression in art, literature, and music, and with 
the passage of time may not endure. The music of the Frank Sinatra and Ella 
Fitzgerald has endured well beyond the stage of popular whim and fancy. 
The Lady Gaga and Miley Cyrus sensations may not. Ong (1970) who has 
written extensively on culture asserts that, in terms of the communications 
media, cultures can be divided into three successive stages: (1) oral, (2) 
script that originates with the invention of the alphabet and alphabetic 
movable types, and (3) electronic. 
 
The Role of Culture in Economic Behavior 
Henrich’s Experiment. Following Ong’s three-stage classification scheme 
and taking into account Henrich’s description of the culture of the 
Machiguenga, it is clear that theirs is one and possibly two stages behind the 
culture of the UCLA students in his experiment. If culture truly matters in 
economic behavior, the differences in his experimental evidence could be 
attributed to cultural differences as Henrich himself asserts. And if Ong is 
accurate on another matter - that only high-tech cultures give rise to 
personalist philosophies (Ong, 1981) - it is possible that the very 
philosophical foundations of the two groups included in Henrich’s 
experiment are substantially different in that the Machiguenga could not 
possibly hold to a personalist philosophy, thereby reinforcing his argument 
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that cultural differences could account for differences in economic behavior 
as indicated in his experiments. 
 The fact that the sharing among the Machiguenga rarely takes place 
outside extended kin circles, as Henrich reports (2000), could provide a 
reason as to why their behavior was so different than the behavior of the 
UCLA students if the proposer and responder regarded each other as outside 
their respective circles. If they found out later that indeed they had been 
wrong in this regard, the proposer would have good reason to share the 
money more equally with the responder to bring their behavior into 
compliance with the cultural norm of sharing within the extended family 
circle. If they discovered later that they were not from the same circle, there 
would be no good reason for the proposer to change the original settlement 
Another possible explanation for the differences Henrich observed is that 
the Machiguenga no doubt were living much closer to a poverty-level 
existence than the UCLA students and it would be reasonable for the 
proposer to take the lion’s share of the money in order to do more to relieve 
the poverty within his/her own extended kin circle. 
Dysfunctional Economic Behavior. Because they are dysfunctional in the 
sense that they exceed any reasonable or normal limit on work, 
consumption, or leisure and therefore inflict loss or punishment on 
themselves, their families, and others, workaholics, shopaholics, and 
compulsive gamblers do not conform to the norms of rational economic 
behavior as asserted by mainstream economics. To illustrate, in a study 
based on a convenience sample of 406 students at a private university in 
Texas nine percent were identified as compulsive buyers3 whose behavior 
was associated with credit card usage (Roberts & Jones 2001). Lee and 
others (2000) found that among women who are television shoppers ten 
percent were compulsive buyers and that this subgroup had more symptoms 
of binge eating than did the other women in the sample. In a report derived 
from three-experiments involving 145 college students, Vohs and Faber 
(2007) found that unwanted spending may occur when temporary lapses in 
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self control are exhibited. Thus the origins of impulsive spending are not in 
the product but the consumer.   
Killinger (1997, p. 6) defines the workaholic as “a person who gradually 
becomes emotionally crippled and addicted to control and power in a 
compulsive drive to gain approval and success”.4 Drawing on a typology 
attributed to Spense and Robbins, Burke and others (2008, pp. 31) identify 
workaholics as persons who score high on work involvement and driveness, 
and low on work enjoyment. They organized their study around three 
workaholism types: work enthusiasts, work addicts, and enthusiastic addicts. 
Based on a survey conducted through the internet that involved 327 
respondents at work in professional and managerial jobs, most of whom 
were women, the authors found that work addicts had a “generally negative 
set of experiences” in terms of perfectionism, delegating work, job 
satisfaction, and work engagement (Burke & others 2008, pp. 30, 37).  
Using data from an online survey of 1,329 respondents, Van Beek and 
others (2011) confirmed that workaholics are driven by controlled 
motivation, that is by external and internal rewards and punishments. They 
recommended that in order to differentiate workaholics from other 
hardworking employees workaholism should be measured not only as 
working excessively but also working compulsively (Van Beek, Taris & 
Schaufeli, 2011). 
Robinson (1998) states that work addiction is a learned addictive 
response to a dysfunctional family of origin and when that child becomes an 
adult workaholic the family lives according to rules dictated by the career 
and work habits of the workaholic. 
The roots of workaholism lie in the Calvinistic tenet that self-indulgence 
is destructive and work is redemptive. Killinger identifies two other sources: 
the dysfunctional family wherein work itself is one member’s drug of 
choice; and the materialism, consumerism, technological growth, and 
competition within which workaholism has flourished (Killinger, 1997). 
As the workaholic breaks down, decision-making becomes more difficult 
due to more episodes of chronic fatigue, panic attacks, loss of concentration, 
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and obsessive overwork. Mistakes follow because as “the Feeling function 
no longer informs judgment,” all that matters is the “A to B goal” (Killinger 
2013, p. 3).   
According to the American Psychiatric Association when persons are 
engaged in internet gaming 
 … certain pathways in their brains are triggered in the same direct 
and intense way that a drug addict’s brain is affected by a 
particular substance. The gaming prompts a neurological response 
that influences feelings of pleasure and reward, and the result, in 
the extreme, is manifested as addictive behavior (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013a, n.p.). 
A gambling disorder “activates the brain reward system with effects similar 
to those of drugs of abuse and … resemble(s) substance abuse disorders to a 
certain extent” (American Psychiatric Association 2013b, p. 16). 
Compulsive gamblers often have “substance abuse problems, mood or 
personality disorders, or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.” In addition 
they may abuse alcohol and experience depression. Complications include 
legal and financial problems, job loss, problems with relationships, and 
suicide (Mayo Clinic 2014, n.p.).  
In the context of economic behavior we refer to gaming and compulsive 
gambling as disordered uses of one’s leisure in that used properly leisure has 
positive or healing effects on the human body and human spirit.   
Persons who are dysfunctional in the ways indicated above can be 
reinforced in that behavior by employers, merchants, and casinos who turn a 
blind eye to the harm being done. For example, the change in slot machines 
from mechanical to microprocessor-controlled devices encouraged rapid 
play, allowed the casino operators to reduce the number of jackpot payoffs, 
making tremendous payoffs possible. As a consequence, many former low-
stakes players lost control of their gambling behavior (McCown & 
Chamberlain, 2000). 
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It follows that cultural differences can make for important differences in 
economic behavior for one overriding reason. Human beings are not 
machine-like products each one identical to every other one in the 
production process. A human being is one-of-a-kind, different from all other 
humans, and cloning aside never to be repeated. Human behavior cannot be 
accurately represented by the homo economicus of mainstream economics 
that rationalizes all economic behavior as maximizing personal net 
advantage.   
If the physical environment influences economic behavior surely the 
same must be said for the cultural environment. Henrich (2000, p. 978) 
poses three questions that lead the way in helping to link culture and 
economic behavior. 
(1) Where do people get the rules, expectations, or notions 
of fairness from?  
(2) Why do these rules, expectations, and notions affect real 
economic behavior?  
(3) How much can the varying rules, expectations, and         
notions affect real  economic behavior? 
The answers to these questions, in turn, will either re-affirm the neo-
classical assumption that humans share the same economic decision-making 
processes or overturn it. (Henrich, 2000). 
Henrich’s First Question. Humans develop their own set of rules, 
expectations, or notions of fairness by reflecting on their own life 
experiences and by accepting them on the word of another, that is through 
reason and faith. The university is an important institution that studies 
human behavior in order to understand it better for the purpose of setting 
down rules, expectations, and notions of fairness in the form of: (1) codes of 
ethical conduct for the professions; (2) statutory law governing criminal 
behavior; (3) tax codes specifying how the burden of supporting the 
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government is to be distributed, and the like. These rules, expectations, and 
notions of fairness may differ for the moral absolutist and the moral relativist 
even if they have attended the same university. Or they may be the same 
because the two share the same faith and frequent the same place of worship. 
In any case rules, expectations, and notions of fairness develop over years 
and are transmitted and reinforced at various times by family, school, place 
of worship, judicial system, and other social institutions.  
Kohlberg (1981) studied the moral decision-making process and 
identified six discrete steps: perception, discernment, resolution, assessment, 
decision, and action. His six-step process is circular rather than linear. A 
person’s basic knowledge of the good is a prerequisite for sensing whether a 
moral problem is present and whether he/she has some personal 
responsibility in the matter. It is determined as well by direct personal 
experience with the other steps, especially with the action step. That is, what 
is learned in the action step improves one’s ability to more readily perceive 
other moral problems thereafte (O’Boyle, Dawson & Tansey, 1996). 
Drawing upon Kohlberg, we identify six stages in a person’s own cognitive 
moral development: (1) avoidance of punishment; (2) desire for reward; (3) 
anticipated disapproval of others; (4) anticipated dishonor; (5) maintaining 
respect of equals and community; and (6) self-condemnation for departing 
from one’s principles. In general, a person progresses to higher stages of 
moral development with age, but there is no assurance that he/she will have 
progressed to the last stage upon reaching adulthood.  
It follows that different persons are at different stages of their own 
cognitive moral development and therefore some are better prepared than 
others to handle ethical issues in economic affairs, and in fact may act 
differently in the same situation. Thus, employers following virtually the 
same decision-making process but at different stages in their cognitive moral 
development likely will behave differently. To illustrate, an employer at the 
avoid-punishment stage might take no action at all in a clear case of 
workplace discrimination especially if there is no punishment likely to befall 
him/her, whereas an employee in anticipated-dishonor stage might act 
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promptly in order to avoid any dishonor. Some senior managers might be 
more prone to schemes that defraud their stockholders when the payoff is 
large enough, while others would not, whatever the size of the payoff, 
because the former have an underdeveloped conscience while the latter are 
much further along in their ethical development. Similarly, workers in the 
same firm may respond differently to defects in workmanship or unsafe 
work processes, one blowing the whistle while others remain silent. And for 
the same reason consumers and employees may respond quite differently to 
the same shoplifting and embezzling opportunities. 
Students of economics, who under the influence of logical positivism 
have formally rejected normative economics, are ill-prepared to address 
ethical issues in economics with the possible exception of matters relating to 
distributive justice. In effect, commutative justice and contributive justice 
are dismissed because all such matters are addressed by the free and 
informed interaction between economic agents in a market economy or are 
subsumed under the common good that is served through the “invisible 
hand.”  In other words, issues of conflict wherein ethics plays a role are 
sorted out by homo economicus. 
Henrich’s Second Question. Rules, expectations, and notions of fairness 
affect economic behavior because they are the mechanisms used to bring 
economic behavior into compliance with the dominant social values of the 
culture. When there are changes in the values that are formalized by specific 
rules, expectations, and notions of fairness, the transmission mechanism 
must change in order to produce the desired economic behavior with as little 
disruption as possible 
Rules, expectations, and notions of fairness change as our insights into 
human action deepen. For example, we have come to understand the silent 
injustice of the gentlemen’s agreement, the glass ceiling, redlining and many 
other unjust practices and we are witnessing considerable efforts to condemn 
these practices as unacceptable behavior in economic affairs. As social 
values change or are ranked differently as to their importance, economic 
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behavior changes too under the influence of new rules, expectations, and 
notions of fairness. 
Changes such as these originate in and are reinforced by changes taking 
place deep within the socioeconomic order and that are changing the very 
institutions that we rely upon to provide stability and continuity as to the 
rules, expectations, and notions of fairness governing economic behavior. 
For some time, we have been under the influence of two powerful 
revolutions. One revolution is based on information technology is affecting 
the five central economic processes of production, distribution, exchange, 
consumption, and investment. The other revolution originates in a shift 
along all four axes of tension underlying the social order and the basic 
institutions that express the fundamental values embodied in culture: (1) 
away from the sacral toward the secular; (2) away from the absolute toward 
the relative; (3) away from the objective toward the subjective; and (4) away 
from the group toward the individual (Becker, 1992). Culture matters in 
economic behavior and becomes much more visible when economic 
institutions are shaken by revolutionary change. 
These four shifts are slowly redefining our culture from one of life and 
hope to one of death and despair. This cultural revolution, in turn, is further 
promoting the individual and dismissing the person by redefining how we 
perceive the economic realities around us. Notice how these two revolutions 
are linked by internet sales of pornography, by chat rooms that redirect 
human behavior from spouse and children to others through human 
imagination and fantasy, by video games, motion pictures, and cable 
television that are deliberately marketing adult materials to children.  
Day-trading over the internet that can distort the true risks involved in 
such practices, replacing them with the false promise of instant wealth and a 
lifetime of ease and comfort. Notice as well internet sales of powerful drugs 
without a prescription are raising false expectations that self-medication will 
produce more favorable outcomes than better-informed prescribed 
medication. And take note of the huge and growing demand for illegal drugs 
in the United States alone that are taken ostensibly to meet the needs of the 
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human body or human spirit but all too often lead to death and despair in 
addiction and homicides attributed to an overdose or a “deal which went 
bad.” And notice how suicide and mercy killing increasingly are rationalized 
by mainstream economics on cost-benefit (pleasure-pain) considerations. 
Conventional economics rationalizes a human life that is not worth living.  
 Henrich’s Third Question. Culture itself and cultural change can and do 
affect real economic behavior profoundly. Note, for instance, the huge 
cultural change that occurred after the end of World War II and how the 
baby boom that followed is still affecting economic affairs. Before the war, a 
woman’s place was in the home. After the war, especially after the 
development of the birth control pill, women could pursue professional 
careers and, with the passage of time, have done so in even greater numbers 
and proportions with the approval of the rest of society. 
In 1985 Nobel Laureate James Buchanan (1985, p. 15) took the 
profession to task in language that hardly can be misunderstood. 
Our graduate schools are producing highly trained, highly intelligent 
technicians who are blissfully ignorant of the whole purpose of their 
alleged discipline. They feel no moral obligation to convey and to 
transmit to their students any understanding of the social process 
through which a society of free persons can be organized without 
overt conflict while at the same time using resources with tolerable 
efficiency.  
 
Fifty years earlier, Keynes (1935, pp. 16-17) offered a similar criticism: 
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-
Euclidean world who, discovering that in experience straight lines 
apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping 
straight -- as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which 
are occurring. Yet, in truth there is no remedy except to throw 
over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean 
geometry. Something similar is required to-day in economics. We 
need to throw over the second postulate of the classical doctrine 
and to work out the behaviour of a system in which involuntary 
unemployment in the strict sense is possible. 
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Reconstructing Economics to Incorporate Culture 
How then do we reconstruct economics to incorporate culture?  We propose 
four points of departure from the mainstream way of thinking: economic 
agency, literary skills, personalistic modeling, and philosophical 
foundations.  
First, we must examine much more carefully the idea that economic 
affairs are best understood and economics is best taught in terms of the 
autonomous, self-interested, thoroughly rational, utility calculating and 
maximizing individual.   
To insist that the autonomous individual is absolutely essential to the way 
in which one thinks about economic affairs requires one to absolutely reject 
the cultural environment as informing economic behavior, all the while 
clinging to the logical inconsistency that the physical environment is a factor 
in economic decision-making. 
Because more is required than simply adding a social dimension to the 
individual dimension of homo economicus it is necessary to cast aside that 
dated concept of the economic agent. In brief, we propose replacing the 
individual with the person, more precisely the acting person, the dynamic 
person of action. This revision would acknowledge that economic behavior 
of consumers, for instance, is at times other-centered, utility-satisficing, 
dependent, and driven by such powerful emotions as fear and love, and that 
poverty, for example, is a problem of insufficient resources to meet minimal 
material needs and should be fully integrated into our treatment of consumer 
behavior.  
Lutz and Lux (1988) proposed a new economics – humanistic economics 
– that argues that homo economicus is not an accurate representation of 
human behavior in economic affairs, that economic science cannot any 
longer ignore the insights from psychology to the effect that human needs 
are hierarchical in the sense that consumers proceed to higher-level needs 
such as the need to belong after lower-level needs such as food, shelter, and 
clothing have been met. In addition, needs are not reducible to wants, and 
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that notwithstanding the mainstream view that all wants are commensurable, 
human needs are incommensurable. 
Years later a set of papers was collected in O’Boyle’s Personalist 
Economics and published in 1998. The book was organized around three 
subjects: premises, description of economic affairs, and economic policy. In 
the section on premises, he argues for replacing homo economicus with 
homo socio-economicus wherein the social dimension of human nature is 
incorporated into the economic agent along with the individual dimension. 
More recently and all the while retaining the individuality and sociality of 
the economic agent, O’Boyle has replaced homo socio-economicus with the 
dynamic acting person to incorporate more directly and accurately the 
philosophy of personalism as a replacement for the individualism of 
mainstream economics.  
Danner and O’Boyle identify the econòmic agent not as a collection of 
preferences or capabilities but an: 
… embodied spirit, a spirit which can act externally only through 
its body, not like a rider on a horse nor a ghost in a machine, but 
essentially and necessarily bonded to the body. The ‘I,’ therefore, 
retains its identity even though the body renews itself many times 
in a lifetime (Danner & O’Boyle 1999, p. 50). 
 
For Danner, the ultimate purpose of economic activity is not maximum 
personal net advantage. Rather, it is whether it adds to or takes from the 
integral development of those who engage in that activity. For Danner 
(2002, p. 129) “… every person is in a real sense an economic person.”  
As an embodied self-consciousness, personhood is best portrayed 
in a career of self-development, the effort and action of becoming 
personal by blending contraries: spirit/body, male/female, 
individual/social, self-aware yet reaching out, unified but 
constantly changing, free but morally restrained (Danner, 2002, p. 
53). 
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Davis thinks about economic agency in terms of individuals who are 
socially-embedded in social and economic relationships and act through 
participation in groups. In arguing for the outward directedness of the 
economic agent he does not reject inward directedness. Rather, the economic 
agent is both (Davis, 2003; Davis, 2011). Additionally and importantly, for 
Davis the “socially-embedded individual” is an active being who is able to 
influence the social structure (Davis, 2003; Davis, 2011). Davis connects 
social embeddedness to the capabilities approach and represents the 
economic agent not in terms of preferences but capabilities.  
Davis (2011) claims that social embeddedness means embedding 
individuals in a social world, coupled with human capabilities including a 
personal identity capability that helps them maintain or re-establish their 
personal identities in complex and changing social interactions that can 
reduce them to mere social aggregates, allows him to offer the concept of the 
individual thus modified as an appropriate replacement for homo 
economicus because it offers a better explanation of human behavior in 
economic affairs. 
Second, we must again emphasize the importance of literary skills both in 
terms of presenting our premises as well as describing economic affairs and 
proposing policy recommendations. Some concepts and ideas are better 
rendered in literary form than in the mathematical form. For example, what 
mathematical expressions adequately substitute for such enduring 
expressions as “the invisible hand,” “the Protestant ethic,” “the euthanasia of 
the rentier,” “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” “the tragedy of the 
commons,” “the prisoner’s dilemma,” “in the  long run we are all dead,” 
“creative destruction,” and “the reserve army of the unemployed”? Helping 
students acquire literary skills means that it is necessary to reverse the 
systematic purging from the economics curriculum of the courses on history 
of economic thought, comparative systems, and economic history, not to 
mention ethics and metaphysics where mainstream economics is woefully 
inadequate. 
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Metaphors such as the one that Alfred Marshall employed to answer the 
question What determines price? can be most helpful if economists are ever-
mindful that metaphors are pedagogical devices that are truly useful when 
they are modified properly to take into account the human persons who are 
being represented. We have in mind something like the following that draws 
on Schumpeter. 
The economy is like a twin-engine aircraft in which competition and 
cooperation supply the power for lift, and intervention and regulation 
function as the aircraft’s control surfaces that the pilot uses to give the craft 
guidance and direction. Admittedly the economy can operate successfully on 
one engine alone, but it performs much better on two engines functioning 
together. Credit creation fuels both engines, and caring for one another 
supplies the engine oil. Justice operates like the oil filter removing such 
dangerous deposits as ill will, discrimination, and disunity that originate in 
violations of commutative, distributive, and contributive justice.  
The entrepreneur is the pilot who charts the destination and course for the 
aircraft and who bears the immediate responsibility if anything untoward 
happens. The central bank is charged with the responsibility of maintaining 
the aircraft to assure that a serious malfunction beyond the control of the 
pilot results in a “soft landing” rather than “crash.” Bankruptcy is the 
parachute that saves the pilot’s life in an extreme emergency and lets 
him/her survive to fly again. 
Culture is to the economy what weather is to the aircraft. A culture of 
death and despair is bad weather for flying; a culture of life and hope is 
favorable weather. Just as meteorologists help us recognize different weather 
systems, philosophers, writers, and others offer a deeper understanding of 
our culture. Ignoring their warning signals can be fatal. 
Third, in bringing greater understanding to economic affairs, some 
modeling less exact and mechanical than econometric models but more 
deeply probing of the person and therefore at once more accurate and more 
personalistic is necessary. Mathematical models use reductionism to deliver 
more precision and detail to our description of economic realities, and thus 
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more superficial certainty. What we need is greater accuracy and 
understanding of the very same economic realities, even when it means less 
authentic certainty. We have in mind the exhaustive study of experience 
rating in unemployment insurance by Becker whose final remarks are a 
model of pushing the data and information as far as the limit of authentic 
certainty permits: 
... if we choose to maintain a set of income maintenance programs that 
are closely geared to the market and operate like deferred wages, with 
benefits proportioned to wages and with taxes levied solely on 
payrolls and employers, unemployment insurance as presently 
constituted will be a necessary part of such a system and experience 
rating is likely to be considered a desirable part of unemployment 
insurance (Becker, 1972, p. 325). 
 
We also point to diagrammatic and schematic renderings as an alternative 
to econometric models.5 Our business in economics is to search for the truth 
ever mindful that the precise findings from econometrics at times are not the 
whole truth because the human spirit is not entirely within our 
understanding. The human spirit is and more than likely always will be part 
mystery. In these circumstances, the researcher cannot achieve the kind of 
authentic certainty with econometric models that mainstream economics 
promises. 
Figure 1 presents a schematic that summarizes much of what we have 
said in the preceding. It brings together five different premises as a point of 
departure - slave, object, agent, human, and person - with their philosophical 
foundations in the context of Becker’s four axes of tension and the One-
Many dichotomy in a way that relates to a market economy and a planned 
economy. We include slave for two reasons: (1) slavery is a part of human 
history and thus of economic history; and (2) the effects of slavery in the 
United States persist more than 150 years after the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and though the civilized world denies it and condemns it, 
slavery is an ongoing practice directly in the sense that slaves are being 
brought into many western countries and indirectly in that the goods 
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produced by slaves are sold in the United States and elsewhere (Bales, 
1999). 
Figure 1 is arranged to be consistent with Ong’s observation that only 
high-tech cultures give rise to personalist philosophies (Ong 1981, p. 200) 
and with John Paul’s insistent re-affirmations that person is nearly divine 
(more below). Accordingly, slave hierarchically is the lowest starting point 
for thinking about economic affairs and person the highest with human, 
agent, and object between the two in that order. Figure 2 focuses on person, 
human, agent, and object in the same hierarchical order as in Figure 1 and 
indicates why the autonomous individual effectively splits economic theory 
in two, and why in principle human and person bring unity to economic 
theory. 




















            Figure 1.  From Slave To Person: The Central Premise in Economics 


















             
Figure 2.  From Object to Person: Connection to Economic Theory 
 




Fourth, we must re-examine the philosophical foundations of economics 
beginning with the recognition that a philosophy other than individualism 
that developed in the second stage of communications media, the script 
stage, no longer serves us as well as it once did. Taking seriously Ong’s 
(1981) observation that only high-tech cultures “have given rise to 
personalist philosophies” it is entirely reasonable to argue that personalism 
is a better foundation for thinking about human behavior in economic affairs 
than is individualism. 
Very recent times have activated concern with the human person as 
person to a degree of explicitation unknown before, and that at many 
levels of awareness. At the highest level of speculative thinking such 
philosophers as Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel and many 
phenomenologists have worked out self-consciously personalist 
philosophies. Such theologians as Hans Urs von Balthasar have 
pointed out that in the past, when nature overshadowed humanity, 
human beings had approached God through nature, whereas today, 
when technology has reduced nature’s dominance and put human 
beings over nature, philosophy has become anthropologized and tends 
to approach God through the human lifeworld and the human person. 
Existentialism is a by-product of the technological scenario ... Earlier 
cultures, less able to analyze themselves than is a high-technology 
culture infused by thought processes made possible by the 
technologies of writing and print (and now electronics), were less 
explicit about both depersonalization and the personal problems of the 
human person (Ong, 1981, pp. 200-201). 
Thus the need to replace the passive homo economicus of mainstream 
economics with the dynamic acting person of personalist economics. This 
substitution promises to unify economic theory that for many years has 
labored under the micro-macro split. That fracture can be healed when 
economic decision-making is seen in terms of the One-Many dichotomy 
wherein homo economicus connects only to the Many and the acting person 
relates to both. Initial steps have been taken in this direction (O’Boyle, 
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2014).  What we have sketched in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are the bare bones 
of a new paradigm that we hope someday will deepen our understanding and 
description of economic behavior even if they are not as mathematically 
precise as we would like. 
Concluding Comments 
Our concluding remarks begin with two observations. First, as Henrich 
suggests, culture influences economic behavior in all three areas of 
economic activity: work, consumption, and leisure. Second, the proof 
inheres not so much in replicating Henrich’s experimental results, but in 
documenting in real-world circumstances how culture influences economic 
behavior. For example, are there differences in work behavior that originate 
in family type? Or differences in consumption behavior originating in 
ethnicity? Or differences in leisure behavior originating in nationality or 
religious affiliation? 
Attention to the role of culture in economic affairs acknowledges that 
humans are more than the one- dimensional, autonomous, individuals, as 
premised in mainstream economics, whose very existence is temporal, 
whose role in economic affairs is strictly instrumental, and whose behavior 
is virtually the same across cultures. Though living in different cultures, 
humans according to mainstream economics are not influenced by those 
differences when it comes to economic affairs. In the mainstream way of 
thinking, the individual according to Waters (1988) acts freely, self-
interestedly, and calculatedly in a self-regulating economy, with behavior 
that is knowable with mathematical certainty and empirical precision, whose 
worth is determined instrumentally. 
We have argued instead that humans are two-dimensional twice over. 
First, humans are individual beings and social beings: solitary and 
communal, self-made and culture-bound, autonomous and dependent, 
rational and emotional, self-centered and other-centered. Second, humans 
are both matter (visible outwardness) and spirit (invisible inwardness). 
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Following John Paul (1998), the human being is the one who pursues the 
truth, and whose body is the medium whereby a person expresses 
him/herself (Wojtyla, 1979). 
  The duality of the human person, rooted in individuality and sociality, 
affords an opportunity to unify economic theory wherein individuality is the 
focus of microeconomics and sociality is the center of macroeconomics. 
Putting the isolated individual at the very heart of economics closes down 
that opportunity and assures that mainstream economic theory will remain 
truncated indefinitely. 
Ong (1967, p. 181) regards the human being as a “bridge connecting the 
material and spiritual, which means, under grace, the material and the 
divine.” In Fides et Ratio (John Paul, 1998) John Paul puts the person 
between the human and the divine. Three years earlier in Evangelium Vitae, 
John Paul professed the sacred dignity of the human person several times.  
Ong (1981) points to the role of human communication in either 
affirming personhood or reducing humans to things. Indeed, all such 
communication displays some regard for the other human being as a person 
and when communication comes to a halt the person is reduced to a thing. 
By avowing the isolated individual and denying the role of culture in 
economic behavior, mainstream economics effectively reduces humans to 
mere instrumentalities, to things. This objectification of humans is necessary 
because culture, as Dulles (1999) observes, is inseparable from religion. It is 
essential, therefore, to exclude culture and the values associated with it 
through its inseparability from religion in order to cling fast to the claim that 
economics must be value-free to have any authenticity as a science. This 
exclusion reflects as well as helps fortify the shift away from the sacral 
toward the secular (see Figure 2).  
Mainstream economics converges with a culture of death and despair. 
Humans are not ends in themselves but only a means whose value depends 
on their usefulness and who have no value whatsoever once they no longer 
are useful. This development, in turn, destroys the very foundation of the 
democratic state, John Paul warns (1995), because once the inviolate dignity 
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of every human being is denied, the personhood and the rights of the weak 
also are denied, allowing the strong to dispose of them freely and to claim 
that what they do reinforces individual freedom and therefore is good and 
justified. Because the powerful claim rights that they deny to the powerless, 
the principle of equality is dismantled and the inevitable outcome is a 
transformation from democracy to tyranny. 
Turning mainstream economics away from its current premises is a 
difficult task because it entails carefully re-examining what has been taken 
as given, what indeed is thought to be immutable. But the task is not 
impossible. A growing number of professional organizations in economics 
are attracting new members to institutional economics, feminist economics, 
humanistic economics, environmental economics, socio-economics, radical 
economics, and personalist economics all of which hold one position in 
common: there is something fundamentally flawed or missing in neo-
classical economics. A number of respected academics including James 
Buchanan, Geoffrey Harcourt, Walter Adams, Wallace Peterson, John 
Elliott, Amartya Sen, Severyn Bruyn, and many others have voiced their 
criticism of mainstream economics, offering other descriptions of economic 
affairs and advocating other policy positions proceeding from different 
premises6. 
The makeover of economics will take much time because the mainstream 
way of thinking about economic affairs is deeply entrenched. However, it 
will take place once neo-classical economists accept that the ultimate end of 
economic systems relates not to maximum personal net advantage but to 




1 “Given” or “allotted” is the operative word in experimental economics. 
2 In direct face-to-face experiments or in the mind’s eye in blind or double-blind experiments. 
3 Identified and defined first by O’Guinn and Faber in 1989 as “chronic, repetitive purchasing 
that becomes a primary response to negative events or feelings” (quoted in Faber & O’Guinn, 
1992, p. 495; emphasis added). 
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4 Killinger’s book was published in 19 countries and nine languages. A new edition appeared 
in 2004 (Psychology Today, n.d.). 
5 McKenna’s 1955 intermediate macro-economic text is an excellent example. His 
representation of the components of aggregate demand and aggregate supply (McKenna, 
1955) is especially noteworthy. 
6 See Waters (1993) for a listing of the twentieth-century social economists who “best 
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